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THE RULE OF LAW AND THE MODERN SOCIAL
WELFARE STATE*
ROSCOE POUNDf

Professor Friedmann, who had already made a notable contribution
to jurisprudence in his Legal Theory, now in its second edition, has
now made a second and perhaps even more notable contribution toward understanding the role and presaging the future of the commonlaw system in the society of today. His purpose is a reassessment of
the function of law and of legal institutions in England a half century
after Dicey's Law and Public Opinion in England during the Nineteenth Century, comparing the economic function of law and how
the common law was adapted to it in the nineteenth century with its
function in the "vastly changed social pattern of contemporary England" (p. 3) in the twentieth century after half of that century has
gone by. He seeks to coordinate recent developments with respect to
the relation of the judicial function and judicial process to social
problems, the role of legislation and the interpretation of statutes, the
growth of standard contracts and collective bargaining, and the change
in the structure and function of the law of property and to appraise
the "interrelation of law and social change in present-day British
society." (p. 3).
Dicey after the end of the nineteenth century showed us where we
then stood and how we had come there. Professor Friedmann in the
middle of the twentieth century essays a harder task of appraising
the common law as it adapts or fails to adapt itself to far-reaching
social and economic changes still in progress and considering how it
may be shaped to the exigencies of those changes. The maxim of
Justinian as to definitions might be made to speak a well-demonstrated
truth by reading it omnis prophetia periculosa. But without assuming
the role of a prophet Professor Friedmann appreciates the mode of
legal-political thought of English-speaking peoples and has faith in
the common law as equal to problems of the social service state as it
was to those of the transition from a feudal relational to an individualist society.
* Being a review of Law and Social Change in Contemporary Britain. By
Wolfgang Friedmann. London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 1951. Pp. xxiv, 310.
t University Professor Emeritus and Former Dean, Harvard Law School.
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.Dealing with many things that are highly controversial there is a
praiseworthy attitude of moderation. There is no extreme dogmatic
pushing of ideas to their limits, no striving for the sensational. Without dogmatism or skepticism for its own sake everything is subjected
to scientific scrutiny and appraisal. The approach is economic functional, without any fundamental assumption that law is a product of
class struggle or that it is as a whole and in detail a product of class
self-interest. There is recognition also of the role of balance and
adjustment as well as of the need of individualized application of legal
precepts of some kinds and in many connections without advocating
an extreme throwing over of technique of application or urging the
impossibility of a judicial process not substantially at large. A constructive program of relative economic realism is a great step forward.
Part I, The Common Law in a Changing Society, takes up the function of the law of contracts in a society in which it is no longer chiefly
the instrument of free bargaining between individual wills but has to
do with standard contracts, collective agreements, statutory clauses
and terms, and transactions to which a public authority is a party.
It turns then to the legal conception of property in the social welfare
or social service state, in which the incidents of ownership at common
law, which in their aggregate made up a complete system of individual
control, have come to be a residue of rights, liberties and powers left
after statutory and judicially established restrictions, compulsory
licenses, social insurance, statutory terms of employment and much
else, have transferred much of the substance of ownership from the
sphere of private to that of public law. Likewise the growth of social
insurance, state assumption of responsibility for the vicissitudes of
life - sickness, accidents, old age, death - has profoundly affected the
law of torts, especially in America, in a tendency to shift the responsibility of the state to enterprises or persons supposed to be better able
to bear it. Criminal law, too, has been affected, particularly by resort
to it as an administrative sanction and in connection with what have
been called public welfare offences. Next this part takes up the effects
of the growth of trade unions, corporate organization in business industry and the professions, and the evolution of public opinion upon
judicial treatment of freedom of trade in connection with contract
and tort. Finally it re-examines Maitland's theory of the social function of trusts and shows the effects of concentration of industry and of
taxation in the social service state in turning to corporate devices instead of trusts.
Chapter 2 takes for its text the recent English edition of a Continental treatise by Karl Renner on the social function of property.1
1. RENNER,

(1949).

THE INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS
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Renner's doctrine is that ownership, while remaining in legal form
an institution of private law implying a total power of doing what one
likes with the thing owned, has in fact become an institution of public
law, that is, one to be treated from the standpoint not of relation between individuals but from that of relation of individuals to the state,
the main functions of which are exercised by complementary legal
institutions derived from the law of obligations. But was it true that
ownership always involved so complete a power of doing what one
liked with the thing owned? Roman law forbade cruel treatment
of a slave and Marcus Aurelius even gave the slave a power of obtaining relief. Also there are texts in the Digest which seem to limit what
today we call the abusive exercise of an owner's liberty of use of what
he owns. But as the law stood in the common-law world in the nineteenth century Renner's proposition was not far from the truth. What
is more significant, however, as Professor Friedmann puts it, is it true,
as things are today, that private ownership of the means of producing
is the key to power? Account must be taken of what Burnham calls
the managerial revolution. The social reformer, he tells us, "must get
away from the pre-occupation of early Marxist thought . . . with

technical legal ownership as the key to economic power." (p. 16).
Transfer of ownership from private to public hands may no longer
be the decisive or necessary means of shifting control. In the modern
state there are means of legal and administrative control over economic
power of the few which may suffice.
Unchecked economic power in the hands of a few has always made
a task for religion, morals, law and politics. The English response to
this task for the past generation, says Professor Friedmann, has been
guided by two principles: (1) attempt to restore equality of bargaining between employer and employee, and (2) restriction, in the public
interest, of economic utilization of private property. (p. 19). As to
the first, equality is sought by requiring safeguarded collective bargaining, by social security legislation directly strengthening bargaining
power by eliminating the worst fears arising from unemployment
or want of capacity to work, by judicial development of relational
duties of the employer, and by restricting contracting away of power
to compete with the employer on termination of the employment, and
by socialization of particular industries. (pp. 20-22). As to the second,
Renner's analysis emphasizes the use of private property to create
capitalistic enterprise. But in a time when men are not thinking
primarily of liberty but are seeking to satisfy the whole scheme of
human wants and expectations, use of property to afford enjoyment
of the amenities of civilized life may make an even greater. challenge
to the social and political reformer. Hence the present century has
seen continual increase of restrictions upon the right of exclusion from,
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the liberties of use and enjoyment of, and the power of disposing of
things owned.
In a brief survey of the way in which English law is now restricting
or taking away the common-law full freedom of utilizing private
property the author puts first abusive exercise of liberties of using, enjoying and destroying or making useless the thing owned. American
law began to deal with these features of ownership earlier than English law. Also American legislation has gone further in imposing limitations on an owner's jus disponendi - but this in order to maintain
the social interest in the security of domestic institutions. Next he puts
legal restrictions on the abuse or non-use of patents. Here again,
especially through judicial decision we have gone further in America.
The old saying of the patent lawyers that the patentee was a czar
within his realm has now lost all point. Third, the author puts official
restrictions on the use of property due to the ideology of the welfare
state and the exigencies of war. One category here is safety, sanitary,
drainage and pure food regulations (in the United States regulations
as to issuance of securities, as to conduct of trade and advertising and
as to use of means of communication), some enforced by courts but
increasingly by administrative agencies. Another is allocation of materials. Also restrictions upon ownership of agricultural land have
been going beyond doing away with the owner's jus abutendi. The
government may prescribe how it is to be used and even dispossess
inefficient farmers. Taxation may be used as a means of national
economic planning. Also there is public control of financial credit.
Finally the most radical step is a general regime of public ownership.
Except for Russia, Great Britain has gone further than any other state
in transfer of industrial property from private to public ownership.
It does so, however, not by direct transfer to the state but by transfer
to public corporations. Basic industries and public services are made
legal persons on the same legal footing as private corporations. It is
significant, as the author observes, that there is a tendency toward
managerial control, as in great private corporations. (p. 29). In all
this, even at the furthest extent, it suggests the French doctrine of
the dismemberment of property. Short of actual transfer to the state,
private property is not done away with. The restraints are not total
nor necessarily permanent. When restraints are lifted or expire the
incidents of ownership come back.
Under the heading Private Property and the Judiciary, Professor
Friedmann compares the attitude of English judges toward legislation
affecting the use of private property with that of American judges
and holds that English judges had an advantage in not being held
down by a written constitution binding them to political and legal
ideas of the past. But the framers of American constitutions and the
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English judges of the end of the nineteenth century were brought up
on Coke's Second Institute and looked at Coke's medieval terminology
in terms of the then accepted doctrine of liberty. The real point is
that England was industrially unified and homogeneous in population,
whereas even twentieth-century America is far from wholly or uniformly industrial and at the end of the nineteenth century still had
great open spaces affording opportunities and even in the same
state generally showed one or more industrial enclaves in a predominantly rural agricultural society. Even at the end of the first half
of the present century it can not be said that the country as a whole
is entirely prepared to receive the welfare state. Social change has
gone forward more slowly than in Great Britain. The ideas which
American judges read into due process of law, English judges read
into their doctrines of interpretation and application of statutes and
of common-law limitations upon official action.
Changed judicial attitude toward legal problems of social change
is taken up in connection with certain maxims, presumptions, and approaches formerly generally received. One is "a well established
though ill-defined rule" that there is a presumption that a statute
should not be held to interfere with private property unless it plainly
says so. In the United States this was put at one time as a rule that
statutes in derogation of the common law were to be strictly construed. My own view is that put in this way it was an invention of
American text writers, although there is the weighty authority of
C. K. Allen that it is an old rule of the courts. Nor do I think it was
quite what Professor Friedmann makes it. Yet such was the effect of
the rule that statutes were to be construed by the common law, which
is enough for his purposes. At any rate, whatever it was, both
here and in England it has for a generation ceased to affect social
legislation.
Likewise the attitude of the courts toward quasi-judicial functions
of administrative agencies has been changing in England and has
definitely changed in America. But, as the author justly observes,
there is danger of legitimating administrative absolutism (p. 307),
and if courts were formerly over-strict, a relaxation rather than an
abandonment of judicial scrutiny is indicated to the end that those
affected by administrative orders be fully apprised of the whole and
real case against them on which an administrative determination is
made. Next we are told of the "increasing robustness" with which
courts of law "pierce the veil of corporate personality." (p. 31). This
doctrine arose in equity, the courts refusing to allow one who sought
to use the separate legal personality of a corporation to get for himself an inequitable advantage at the expense of others. It was esoecially invoked to prevent frauds upon creditors and, as the author notes,
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was carried further and employed more generally in the United States
than in England. In origin it is an application of the fundamental doctrine that equity looks at the substance rather than the form. There
is nothing out of the normal course of legal evolution in this. Roman
law in the classical era moved out of the stage of strict law where
form was decisive, and the common law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries took the same step.
Nevertheless what Professor Friedmann calls the "private-property
approach" still prevails in many fields not yet sufficiently penetrated
with consciousness of social problems. He gives as one example
limitation of injunction and declaratory judgment as public-law remedies to matters where a "quasi-proprietary" interest can be ascertained.
But that limitation applied originally to those remedies as private-law
remedies and for more than a generation American courts have been
extending them to secure interests of personality no less than interests
of substance. The limitation did not grow out of an idea of securing
private property but out of difficulties involved in the old procedure in
chancery.2 Also he calls attention to the legal status of the host of
people who are now empowered to enter private property in the
exercise of a public function - police, factory inspectors, air raid
wardens and the like. These, he tells us, are still judged by the unsuitable private-law categories of invitees or licensees. (p. 32). To the
Continental lawyer with his Roman public law background the doctrine that a public officer or administrative agent must justify trespass
on person or property and is privileged only within the legal limits of
his authority and is thought of as a licensee by operation of law, seems
clearly unsuitable to the times. But the mode of thought behind it is
deep-rooted in Anglo-American experience. Moreover the tendency
of the type of person mentioned not to consider what the law gives
them authority to do but, instead, how to do most thoroughly and expeditiously what they conceive will advance what they take to be the
ultimate purpose of their authority, as appeared abundantly not long
since in the enforcement of national prohibition, shows that there is
more than an idea of the sanctity of private property behind the common law at this point. If we think of a social interest in the individual
life as a great social interest, not to be ignored by thinking of it in
terms of an individual interest of personality, and remember the course
of development of the common-law doctrine, we may feel that experience developed by reason is behind the insistence of our law that
the official is not above the everyday law. It should be noted, however, that the common-law categories of invitees, licensees and tres3
passers are not wholly satisfactory for the purely private law.
2. See Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REv. 640 (1916).
3. See Marsh, The History and Comparative Law of Invitees, Licencees
and Trespassers,69 L.Q. Ruv. 182 (1953).
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Adaptation of a system of law to social change is not something
wholly exceptional - a special problem exclusively characteristic of
our time. Social change goes on somewhat continuously in Western
civilization. Even great major changes are fairly constant. Change
from a kin-organized to a politically organized society, change from
the law of a city state to a law of the world, change from the relationally organized society of the Middle Ages to a society of competing
individuals, change from the state which did no more than preserve
order and secure individual freedom to the social service state, in
America change from a polity of colonies each a separate entity
governed from Westminster to an independent federal state growing
from a fringe of settlements along the Atlantic coast to a nation of
continental domain, and change from the pioneer-rural-agricultural
society of the formative era of our law to the urban-industrial society
becoming predominant today -such changes have made it necessary
continually throughout legal history to adapt experience to new situations, to apply reason to those situations and test it by further experience, and to go on in an endless succession of reason and experience,
but always leaving some tried acquisition of each stage as an enduring
acquisition of the law.
Chapter 3, Changing Functions of Contract and the Common Law,
begins with an excellent analysis of the social function of contract
in the formative era of modern industrialist capitalist society. There
are found to be four elements: (1) freedom of movement, (2) insurance against calculated economic risks, (3) freedom of will, and (4)
equality between the parties. (p. 34). They are closely connected and
to some extent overlap, but each has a distinct meaning. The first two
are said to be essentially formal in character, while the other two
express besides political and social ideologies. But, he tells us, "The
difficulty of bridging the gap between the formal and substantial
aspects of both freedom and equality is evident in the pathetic contrast between the law of contract as it is taught in most textbooks,
and modern contract as it functions in society." (p. 34). Yet in the
economic realities of today is there nothing left of freedom of will in
the everyday legal transactions of everyday men? There never was a
time in the heyday of the classical law of contracts when everybody
could be assured of being able to get every legal transaction he wished
or the terms he wished. What is meant is that the area of freely willed
engagements, fashioned as one wills, is now more and more restricted
and in order to insure a substantial equality legal transactions are
more and more, or in more and more respects, made for, rather than by,
the individual man. Even so, however, one need only go over the
weekly advance sheets of the National Reporter System to see that a
vast amount of litigation in the courts day by day runs according to the
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law of contracts in the books. But that a profound change has been
taking place is true enough, and that is the author's point.
Looking in detail at what he calls the four corner stones of the
classical law of contracts, the first, "freedom of movement" expresses
the idea of the progress from status to contract, and it is pointed out
that in the industrial economy of today we are reverting to something
very like status. We are told rightly that a new kind of immobility
results from the profound changes produced by the social welfare
responsibilities of the state of today, by group organization and collective bargaining in industry, and the condition of industrial mobilization forced upon Western states by the international situation since
the outbreak of the first World War. (p.35). But in the United States
a very large proportion of workers move freely from one job to another or from one kind of work to another or from one part of the
country to another. We have gone no further in America than supplementing the law of contracts. We have not wholly discarded it. The
second corner stone, "insurance against calculated risks," assumes a
free-enterprise society in which rewards for enterprise or speculation
are restricted only within very wide limits if at all. The social interest
in the security of transactions has a high valuing. The sanctions of
damages and specific performance make it possible to take the calculated risks which such an economy calls for. This presupposes that the
parties entering into the transaction are equal. So the sanctions are
the same whether or not there is a social and economic equality.
Section 406 of the Soviet Civil Code (not however enforced) suggests
a judgment with reference to who can best bear the loss. Standard
contracts, standard provisions and new doctrines as to frustration and
judicial modification of bargains or relief from burdens undertaken
are the present day response to the economic order of the time.
Consideration of the element of freedom of will leads to comparison
of Professor Friedmann's book with Dicey's Law and Public Opinion in
England During the Nineteenth Century. Dicey wrote from the standpoint of the political interpretation, characteristic of English jurists.
Professor Friedmann writes from a social philosophical interpretation
usual among Continental jurists of the present century. As to their
relation to law, the changed public opinion of which Dicey wrote and
the social change of which Professor Friedmann writes come to the
same thing. In a democratic politically organized society social change
is reflected in changes in public opinion and that opinion as it becomes
definite controls the operation of political machinery. But in politically
organized societies, not or imperfectly democratic, social change operates upon the repositories of power, perhaps more or less under pressure of public opinion, as posing them problems which must be met
if they are to endure. In effect Dicey and Friedmann are both writing
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of social change and the law. So, too, were the Greek writers on the
philosophy of social control, the medieval jurists who sought from the
Roman law, Christian texts and Aristotle universal ideas for the relationally organized society of the Middle Ages. So were the law-ofnature jurists of the seventeenth and eighteenth-century philosophy
of law in the era of discovery, colonization and expanding individual
opportunity in transition to a competitive individualist society. So
did Kant when he sought to reconcile liberty and the authority of law
in formulating the theory of justice which governed in the nineteenth
century. Professor Friedmann's book, therefore, is in the right line
of the books which, in wrestling with the problems to which the legal
order must be directed, have shown the path of development of the law.
Dicey shows that Bentham, who urged that it was the task of law
to extend the sphere and enforce the obligation of contract, assumed
parties free to bargain out the conditions and terms of agreement.
Physical persons possessed of free wills were to argue and reason
themselves into free agreement. Hence control over the terms of contract was limited to a few categories of contravention of the policy
of the law- infringement of the social interest in the general morals
and the social interest in the security of social institutions. It ran
counter to the nineteenth century idea of the end of law for the state
to dictate or alter the terms of contracts. But more and more today
the parties to contracts are not all of them physical persons. One
or both may be a corporation so that the presupposition of the law of
contracts in the last century fails. The idea of agreement of freewilling individual men is closely connected with the assumption of
equality of bargaining power on each side of the contract, next to be
considered. The first service undertaken by the nascent social service
state was regulation of contracts of individuals with public service
companies and incorporated public utilities where what used to be
called virtual monopoly gave an unfair advantage in bargaining.
However, what has developed as a function of the social service state
began before the days of corporations in the case of carriers and innkeepers because of the nature of the service involved in the contract
and its relation to the general security.
As to the fourth element, equality of bargaining power, the idea of
equality before the law was directed to impartial award of remedy for
breach or impartial enforcement of performance.
"[F]ormal equality, to vote, to make contracts, to migrate, to marry,
was regarded by early utilitarianism and democratic theory as automatically conducive to social liberty and equality." (p.39). Hence the
author's main purpose in the chapter under consideration is to analyze
the extent to which "a mixture of legislative developments and judicial
interpretations have bridged the growing gap between the early phi-
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losophy of contract and the reality of contemporary society." (p.39).
At the outset it must be admitted that in no system of law has there
ever been absolute freedom to enter into whatever engagements men
chose with the expectation of having them enforced by public authority. Nor has the law ever kept its hands off completely in case of
manifest inequality between the parties. Equity went some way to
check over exertion of economic power. Also the courts came gradually to recognize group pressure as legitimate in economic and social
conflicts. But the power of the courts was limited. They could not go
far in creative treatment of the conditions which have arisen. Legislation has been needed and the more important changes that may have to
come must come through legislation. (pp.42-43).
Four main social causes of transformation of contract are considered: (1) concentration in industry and business corresponding to
increasing urbanizing and standardizing of life bringing about the
"standard contract" or "contract of adhesion"; (2) increasing substitution of collective for individual bargaining leading to the collective
contract between management and labor, with a varying degree of
government interference; (3) expansion of the welfare and social
service functions of the state leading to statutory terms of contracts
substituted for or added to the terms agreed upon and increase of
contracts in which government departments or other public authorities are on one side and a private party on the other, leading in the
United States to abuses under the title of "renegotiation"; and (4) the
effect of social, political, or economic upheavals, such as war, revolution or inflation. (pp.44-45). These have had a serious effect upon the
law of contracts in the development of doctrine as to frustration and
extension of legal excuses for non-performance.
Collective bargains between employer and employee are put under
administrative supervision, although the courts have an ultimate task
of enforcing them. It might well be said in the United States that
these engagements should be regarded as in a separate department of
the legal system rather than as belonging to the law of contracts. 4 The
totalitarian state takes away the autonomy and freedom of workers but
purports to give them security and protection in return. In AngloAmerican law we have done no more than take some relatively short
steps. But it is suggested that in view of the continually growing
emphasis on defence and production, of the increasing assumption
of government responsibility for the economic well being of the people
and of the steadily increasing area of government planning, the social
service state of today may prove to be a station on the road to totalitarianism. (pp.54-55).
4. See Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44 HARv. L.

REV. 572, 606-08 (1931).
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Professor Friedmann distinguishes four broad methods of public
control over the terms of contracts. (1) Contracts may be made void
by statute or judicial decision because in whole or as to certain parts
they contravene principles of economic equality. Examples may be
seen in the statutes against payment of wages by orders on company
stores and in legislation as to warranties by the insured in life insurance policies. The author puts also invalidation of contracts between employer and employee as to exercise after leaving the employment of the employee's skill in the calling in which he has been
trained. But courts of equity in laying down this doctrine were following a settled proposition of the common law as expounded by Coke,
namely, a presumption against restraints upon liberty. (2) Compulsory
terms may be required to be incorporated in contracts in order to
conform to certain social policies. Examples may be seen in factory
acts, housing laws and minimum wage laws. (3) In England the
Agriculture Act and the Landlord and Tenant Act allow administrative authorities in certain cases to vary the terms of leases. (4) In
England in case of nationalization of an industry, contracts made by
the company taken over may be "terminated" or "disclaimed" by the
public authority. (pp.55-59). If a state of the United States were to
do these things as to past transactions questions would arise as to
the constitutional provision against impairing the obligation of contracts.
In the common law world until recently we have not had to think
particularly about incorporated public authorities as owners and managers of industries, as providers or administrators of public utilities, or
as in other capacities requiring the making of contracts. The crown
at common law acted through ministers or bailiffs who, having had
authority conferred on them and keeping within the limits of that
authority, could justify what they did, but otherwise were on the
same footing as private individuals and subject to question as to their
acts in ordinary proceedings in the ordinary tribunals. This has been
a fundamental doctrine of the common law at least since 1338 when
the Chief Justice of the King's Bench fined a sheriff for not executing
a writ against an outlaw because of a private letter from the King
(Edward III) telling him not to do so. The private letter from the
King did not justify the sheriff in disobeying the writ. Where there
are legal transactions between public authorities and private persons,
the law as administered in the ordinary tribunals binds them alike.
The public officer and the public authority are in no superior position
as such. Where, on the other hand, one public authority contracts with
another, as the state is acting through each, the relation is that of
two agents of a common principal. Each may insist against those who
act in the name of the principal that they act within the authority
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given them. But when the state sets up enterprises and conducts utiliies or industries either directly or through newly set up public corporations, the historical common-law doctrine has to meet situations for
which it was not designed.
Continental law distinguishes a private-law contract between a
public authority and a private person from transactions of an administrative public-law character. The former is in the jurisdiction of the
civil courts. The latter is in the jurisdiction of the administrative
courts. The test is said to be the nature of the service and activity in
question. In general it is presumed that the state operates as a
private-law person when it carries on an industrial or commercial
service or lets property. But with the increasing multiplication of
services performed by the social service state the line is harder and
harder to draw.
This leads to the question whether in view of the development of
public welfare services by the state there is need of departing from
the traditional fundamental doctrine of Anglo-American law committing all controversies in the end to the law of the land administered
in the ordinary courts. We have no ethos of administrative adjudication and it has been a slow process to make our administrative agencies
in the United States conscious of the fundamentals of adjudication.
The zeal of subordinates, the pressure of politics and the wide scope
for discretion with no traditionally taught principles of exercising it,
make it doubtful whether we could at this late stage of our legal development succeed in setting up a division of jurisdiction between the
ordinary and the administrative courts.
Professor Friedmann speaks of a conflict between "public policy
and private interest." But a controversy between an administrative
agency and an individual is not fairly stated put in this way. There is
a public policy in maintaining the interests of individuals as well as
one in upholding the agencies of government. There is danger of
answering questions of this sort in the way they are put. Interests
should be compared on the same plane. The "relative prevalence of
public policy or private interests" may mean preferring bureau convenience to constitutionally guaranteed rights of individuals. We saw
under the regime of national prohibition what this may mean. Privileges of the existence and extent of which an administrative agency
is the judge run counter to the whole course of development of AngloAmerican law. Legislation may confide wide discretionary powers to
administrative agencies with which the courts cannot interfere. But
in the United States such grants of power are subject to constitutional
limitation applied in the ordinary courts. To have a different set of
courts applying them to a not clearly defined category of administrative determinations would lead to conflicts such as arise in some of
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the states of the United States where criminal cases are reviewed in
a court of criminal appeals of final jurisdiction while civil causes are
reviewed finally in a supreme court. Unhappily the two courts do not
always agree on points of law which are involved in each type of
case.
Economic upheavals have occurred from time to time in legal history
with no little regularity. Experience of how to promote good faith
as a presupposition of the economic order has developed what has
become, substantially, a universal law of obligations governing the
relations of the parties to everyday transactions of economic life. Even
the radical overturning of the economic order in Soviet Russia has not
wholly eliminated the civil law of obligations. That the two recent
world wars should in their aftermath produce some juristic doctrines
to meet the exigencies of the twentieth-century upheaval is to be expected. Development of the doctrine of frustration is not a unique
phenomenon. It is not out of line with the general course of evolution
of law. Indeed that and kindred doctrines have been worked out by
the normal procedure of experience developed by reason and reason
tested by experience. The persistent problem of balance of stability
and change has had new illustrations of how it recurs and how the law
meets it.
Among the conclusions with which the chapter ends, one is of particular interest: public law increasingly controls the quasi-legislative
function of contract. (pp.70-71). This refers to article 1134 of the
French Civil Code: "Agreements legally formed take the form of law
for those who have made them," a proposition of Roman law, repeated
by Domat in the seventeenth century and by metaphysical jurists in
the nineteenth century. As things are going today individuals no
longer make law for themselves by free contract. The law as it is
coming to be more and more controls the power of individuals to
make law for themselves by legal transactions.
Chapter 4, Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability,
propounds two theses: that at first there was in England a reasoned
development by legislation of what had been worked out by experience
in judicial decision, but that later, "after a period of leadership and
initiative in the adaptation of the law of tort to the new principles
of public policy, the English judiciary is now reverting to a more
cautious and conservative attitude as an ever-swelling number of
statutes give articulate expression to new social policies." (p. 74).
Apart from and before the advent of the social service state the courts
in the common-law world have been developing a tort liability without regard to fault based upon control over things owned or agencies
employed in order to stimulate the fullest diligence to maintain the
general security. With the coming of the service state this theory is
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reinforced and carried further under a general humanitarian idea of
providing for every one a full social and economic life in civilized
society. In the law of torts in England the author sees this as leading
to two new types of liability: (1) duties of one in control of property
to the public, and (2) duties of employers to employees. Under the
first head he takes up cases of liability of a manufacturer for negligence
to an ultimate purchaser. Here American courts seem to be going
further than British courts. At least there is some recent suggestion
in the American state courts that the idea of inquiring for negligence
of the manufacturer and establishing it by the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is to be given up and an absolute liability of the manufacturer
is to take its place. Next he considers extension of the liability of a
principal for the torts of an independent contractor. Here the principal has no control so that the judicial development on the basis of
control and correlative responsibility for the general security does not
apply. Also he adds widening of liability under the doctrine of Rylands
v. Fletcher s and extension of the liability of owners of premises. In
much of this there is no systematic idea of liability but there is suggested a theory of what I have called the involuntary good Samaritan.
As to duties of employers to employees the law has gone far both in
Great Britain and in America both through judicial decision and
especially through legislation going far beyond requirements of maintaining the general security.
It is pointed out that the older social legislation sought to mitigate
social insecurity of the underdog. Later it has aimed at an over-all
insurance and a question of setting off of social insurance as against
tort liability is suggested in which British legislation made a rough
compromise. (pp. 87-90). As the idea of the involuntary good Samaritan has developed in legislation there has been return to judicial
conservatism. (pp. 93-96). In the balance of stability and change,
movement back and forth between new developments and recurrence
or obstinate adherence to older rules and doctrines out of line with the
new developments is a familiar phenomenon in legal history. One
need only recall Lord Mansfield and his immediate successors.
Professor Friedmann holds that the main function of the law of
torts is the reasonable adjustment of economic risks in society. Historically both the law of torts and the criminal law grew up to the
idea of the social interest in the general security. With this he contrasts what he calls the social insurance principle, that is, insuring
the individual social and economic life, or ultimately the individual
life as a whole. The two have not merged in this ultimate. But, as
he says, the difference between tort liability dependent on negligence
as it has come to be and strict social insurance liability is relatively
B. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
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small and there is temptation to give up the culpability idea wholly.
(p.99). He tells us, however, that there are three answers. One is that
the law of torts even today affects large numbers of people who are
neither employers nor manufacturers but are ordinary individuals
not covered by insurance. The difference between liability for negligence and strict liability is still important. Second, coupling of tort
liability with standards of conduct is practically significant for maintaining the general security. Interest in the observance of these standards often passes from the enterprise to its insurer which, where the
liability is not absolute, has a definite pecuniary interest in careful
conduct by the insured. It is even in the interest of workmen operating machines to have liability dependent upon maintenance of
certain standards of conduct, since this adds to the civil and penal
sanctions against the manufacturer or employer the pecuniary interest
of the insurance company in the maintenance of standards. Third,
even if the compensatory functions of the law of torts were taken
over entirely by state insurance, the state which paid the loss to the
insured victim of fault might well claim against the one whose fault
caused the injury.
In chapter 5, Public Welfare Offences, the author discusses a novel
case in Australia -

Cain v. Doyle 6 - in which the manager of a

Commonwealth munitions factory was prosecuted for terminating the
employment of the complainant without reasonable cause. The statute
provided for imprisonment or a money penalty. The only basis of
conviction could be a section of the Crimes Act that "any person who
procures or by any act of commission in any way directly or indirectly

knowingly concerned in or a party to any offence against any law of
the Commonwealth, shall be deemed to have committed that offence." 7 The manager had not discharged the complainant, but he had
in effect knowingly advised it. Hence it was argued that he was .an
accessory of the Commonwealth and should be held under the statute
as a principal. The court, one judge dissenting, held that the Commonwealth could not be guilty of the principal offence and affirmed dismissal of the complaint. Four opinions were written and there was
much difference as to the grounds of decision. Three judges held that
the evidence did not sufficiently establish that the manager procured
the dismissal or was a party to it. One held the prosecution not maintainable for four reasons: one, that the fundamental idea of a prosecution was one of an offence against the King's peace; second, in case
of any serious offence the Commonwealth itself would have to be the
prosecutor; third, in the case before the court the Commonwealth
would have to pay a fine to itself; and fourth, where imprisonment is
6. 72 C.L.R. 409 (Austr. 1946).
7. Commonwealth Crimes Act, 1914-1932, § 5.
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an alternative penalty, the Commonwealth could not be included since
it could not be imprisoned. Two judges considered that criminal liability of the Commonwealth was not a theoretical impossibility but
that there was a strong objection against so interpreting the statute
because it was opposed to received legal conceptions, constitutional,
analytical and historical. There ought to be a clear expression of
intent to enact anything so seriously contravening well settled ideas.
Any fine would accrue to the federal treasury which would pay the
fine to itself. The Commonwealth, which was to be fined could remit
the fine. Also, they said, if the statute was interpreted to allow the
Co mnonwealth to be held for a crime two or more ministers could
be held for conspiracy. The Chief Justice said that without recourse
to prosecution violation of the duty imposed by the statute might give
the complainant a remedy by injunction or mandamus. The state
courts in the United States are agreed in denying the injunction in
such cases, but mandamus to require reinstatement is generally allowed. Two judges did not consider the difficulties in enforcement
insuperable and considered that effectiveness of the statute would be
seriously impaired if it was not construed to allow the manager to be
held as accessory. Professor Friedmann agrees to this. (pp. 106-07).
But if we are talking about realities, why think of principal and accessory? Why not prosecute directly as offenders against the statute
the manager, superintendent or director who exerted his power wrongfully? That would be the common law solution. Proceed against those
who justify under the crown's authority what the crown could not
do rightfully.8 But if we look at the matter from a public-law standpoint, as the social service state has two aspects, one as ruler and the
other as operator of public service or industrial enterprises, why can't
the state in its ruler aspect prosecute itself in its public service aspect
and inflict penalties on those who represent and control that aspect?
In chapter 6, Freedom of Trade, Public Policy and the Courts, the
author tells us that "the courts have conspicuously failed to develop
the notion of 'public interest' to any real significance." (p. 131). But
does he develop a meaning? The real point, I submit, is to identify
it with the end of law and see that it is nothing less than giving effect
to the most we can of human desires and expectations with the least
sacrifice. Writers too often take the public interest for something
given in each particular situation. The author tells us that the problem
of the legal order does not lie in recognizing the "elementary truth"
that the aim of law is securing the maximum freedom for every individual which is compatible with an equal measure of freedom for
every one else, but in finding the way to realize it. I submit that it is
8. Cf. the sheriff in Reginald de Nerford's case, Y.B. Hil. T. 14 Edw. III,
pl. 54 (1339-1340).
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not merely to secure a maximum of freedom but to keep freedom
in balance with other fundamental human demands or expectations
so as to give effect to the whole scheme of them with the least
sacrifice.
The chapter ends with an interesting discussion of the policy of
English law which seeks to maintain neutrality in the struggle of
social and economic interests. One might query as to the real commonlaw approach. American cases as to unfair competition between individuals are part of the common-law picture. They seem to go on a
proposition that one who intentionally does anything which on its face
is injurious to another is liable to repair resulting damage unless he
can establish a liberty or privilege by identifying his claim to act as
he did with some recognized public or social interest. The question is,
then, what will justify prima facie aggression on personality or substance. Fair competition in business or industry has been relatively
easy to work out. The secondary boycott and advancement of the
labor movement have made difficulties. In all cases pressure short of
duress exerted in the promotion of a legally recognized interest is held
justification. But when and why are interests legally recognized?
When experience has shown it can be done with a minimum unsettling
of the general adjustment of competing social interests or reason has
shown it can be made to adjust with the other interests pressing on
the legal order to be recognized and secured.
As the preceding chapters had gone forward from Dicey, chapter 7,
Trusts, Corporate Bodies and the Welfare State, goes forward from
Maitland. Maitland's main theme is the contrast between the personalized concept of a trust and the impersonal "collectivized" German concepts of an association (Verein), an incorporated public
institution (Anstalt) or a private charity (Stiftung). (pp.133-134),
We are told that today the contrast as to unincorporated associations
and endowments has much narrowed; that unincorporated associations
have acquired so many of the attributes of legal personality that while
the difference between incorporated and unincorporated bodies is still
important it is longer fundamental; that there is a steady gain in the
advantages of incorporation, and that in the United States and Canada
the tendency is to incorporate charities. (p.134). Now, it is said the
purposes of a charitable trust are achieved through incorporation
"in the depersonalised manner which distinguishes the modern largescale corporation from the old-fashioned trustee." (p.142). Partly
this is due to exigencies created by the tax laws. Partly, perhaps, it is
an incident of the "managerial revolution."
But while incorporation of trustees is changing the picture drawn
by Maitland, the author points out a new and serious problem presented to the law of today by the unincorporated association. Through
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their power of expulsion and of refusing admission, professional organizations, churches, labor unions and societies for the protection of
trades exercise in effect a compulsory control over a great part of the
population without being subject to the checks and control which obtain in the case of incorporated organizations. The courts have consistently stressed the social and club features of associations of this
kind and so minimized the scope of enforceable rights of an injured
member. (pp.145-46). "The corporate and collective organisation of
industry, both on the employers' and on the workers' side, has now
proceeded to a point where in the more highly industrialised democratic countries it stops little short of de facto compulsion. The lone
dissenter, or a rebel who criticises the management, will not only be
expelled but he will normally be unable to find work in his trade....
Freedom to organise is rapidly becoming compulsion to organise."
(p.147). This is acutely controversial at the moment in connection
with the Taft-Hartley Act. Professor Friedmann calls for statutory
appeals in case of professional bodies exercising disciplinary jurisdiction and a different policy as to private associations which interfere
with fundamental principles of individual freedom.
Next he takes up public-law problems in recent English decisions.
Under Dicey's influence "systematic and theoretical study of public
law was neglected until the flood of new social services, ministerial
powers, administrative tribunals, and public corporations injected
public law problems into English law far in advance of its theoretical
study." (p.153). For historical reasons, resulting from the contest of
the common-law courts with the Stuarts, English law referred what
we now think of as public law to the private law of persons. At the
other extreme there are those in England and in America who would
turn over the whole field of the legal order to public law. Thinking
primarily of the classical English recognition of private law only he
argues that democratic societies need "the dichotomy of public and
private law." (p.155). "They have a rapidly increasing number of
public bodies, law-making authorities, and social services, of all kinds,
which cannot be treated on a par with contract or property relations
between private parties yet must be brought within ascertainable legal
rules." (p.15 5). That is, a true public law does not mean relegation of
conduct of officials of the social service state to the domain of justice
without law. The question is how a kind of administrative justice
can be developed within the Anglo-American legal system. (p.157).
Next follows a survey of public law problems in recent English
decisions. He finds three: (1) conflict of public interest and private
rights, (2) the border-lines between administrative discretion and
legal duties, and (3) sovereignty and equality in the legal relations
between the state and other public authorities on the one side and the
individual citizen on the other.
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As to the first he points out a distinction between the United States
and Great Britian in that the main protection of personal liberty in
British law is in the strength of public opinion and the determination
of an independent judiciary to protect basic liberties unless they are
directly and clearly restricted by Parliament. Yet the courts are
sometimes prepared to sacrifice the protection of personal liberty for
reasons of state. Speaking of the dissenting opinion of Lord Atkin
in Liversidge v. Anderson,9 the author says: "Logically, it is submitted,
Lord Atkin's argument is unassailable. The difference between him
and the majority was not a matter of logic but of policy. The majority
were prepared to ignore ordinary rules of interpretation, because they
regard the public interest of national safety in times of war as superior
to the normal safeguards for the liberty of the individual." (p. 158).
Of this Professor Friedmann says rightly that present-day social and
international devolpments may make the distinction between war
and peace, between emergencies and normal situations, very precarious. (p. 159). In more than one of the United States constitutional
provisions for emergency legislation have made the "emergency
clause" a joke. In time of economic depression we have seen interpretation go to great lengths under the excuse of emergency. The
Roman emperor began as first citizen given the widest powers for life
in an emergency. Here again we come to the problem of balance. The
central task of administrative law is to keep in balance the exigencies
of efficient administration and security of the individual life. The
absolute state and the believers in administrative absolutism know of
no limitations but by the grace of the sovereign in the one case and the
discretion of the administrative agency in the other. Blackstone's
doctrine that "the public good is in nothing more essentially interested
than in the preservation of every individual's private rights" and
Dicey's doctrine of the xule of law are at one pole; the doctrine of the
totalitarian state is-at the other. But the balance required (wrongly
stated, I submit), as one between the social welfare and individual
freedom, must determine the problem as to the limits of administrative
discretion. It is said to be the very heart of the Continental doctrine
of administration. (pp. 163-64).
A closely connected problem grows out of the difficulty of exact
definition of the three departments of government according to the
doctrine of separation of powers. In modern administration not only
do administrative and judicial powers run into each other but legislative and administrative functions are not easily set off. Between
a general rule, applicable to an indefinite number of persons and a
particular order directed to or affecting a particular individual or
group or corporation, the difference may be one of degree. (p. 168).
9. [1942] A.C. 206, 225-47 (1941).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VoL. 7

But is not the latter a judgment rather than a legislative act? Administrative rules are quasi-legislative. They should be made on the plan
of legislation: upon information as to all sides of the matter dealt
with and opportunity of interested persons to be heard as statutes
are. Likewise administrative orders should be made as judgments are:
upon a full and fair hearing of all sides. But we are told that as the
distinction between legislative and administrative action cannot be
drawn absolutely, the classification of a particular official act will
depend on "a careful weighing of the needs of public administration
against legitimate interests of the individual." (pp. 168-69). Who is
going to do this weighing? If administrative agencies themselves do it
or it is done by administrative courts as part of the administrative
hierarchy, it is clear enough that supposed needs of public administration will always prevail. So far as the weighing has put the results
in the form of constitutional provisions or statutory definitions or precepts in the Anglo-American polity the ultimate determination is one
for the courts.
Under the heading Statutory Immunities and Legal Duties, the author puts a typical case. During the war the Defence of the Realm
Act relieved local authorities from their duty of lighting streets and
gave them power to build air shelters. There were many accidents
to pedestrians, cyclists and motorists who in the blackout ran into
surface shelters, fell into bomb craters or slipped on the steps of
underground shelters. It would seem that at common law, while the
local authority was relieved from liability for failure to light, its duty
of exercising due care in carrying out its power of building air shelters
and its control of unlighted streets was not affected. But in a number
of cases the courts held for some time that where the local authority
built a shelter in the street there was no duty of putting in warnings
for those who had to use the street at night. The sound rule was
finally laid down by Lord Greene, M.R., in 1945 that the duty of
reasonable care not to subject users of the street to an unreasonable
risk of injury was not superseded by suspending street lighting. 10 But
that there were three English cases to the contrary between 1940 and
1941 shows the growth of the administrative idea in England in war
time. Professor Friedmann suggests a distinction between authority
to build an air raid shelter, to maintain the general security, and
authority to conduct a bus service as a social service, putting the distinction on the ground of a prevalent policy of organizing bus service
inside, not outside, the common law. In 1941 Lord Simon emphasized
the public law aspect of such questions.' But Lord Atkin's dissent
is notable. He argued that the board which had contracted to build
10. Fisher v. Ruislip-Northwood Urban Dist. Council, [1945] K.B. 584.
11. East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent. [1941) A.C. 74 (1940).
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flood banks was in the same position as a private contractor and liable
in damages for failure to carry out the work with the skill reasonably
to be expected. Lord Simon's proposition that liability would hamper
the board in the exercise of its public duties seems to be in the prevailing direction. The author's summary is: "[A] public authority ...
should clearly be liable, in so far as its legal position can fairly
be compared to that of a private contractor." (p.177). As a matter
of common law I should agree. But how far can such lines be drawn
in the social service state?
"English law," says the author, "has no theory of the State." (p.177).
Historically this is true. To Blackstone it was only a matter of persons
acting under authority of the Crown, liable for action beyond what
they were authorized to do, and justified so far as the authority the
Crown could give them extended. It is not easy to fit the exigencies
of the social service state into the traditional Anglo-American legal
system. But the need of distinguishing between different aspects and
functions of the state is quite as urgent as it has proved to be in the
rest of the world. In Continental Europe whether the civil or the
administrative courts have jurisdiction depends on whether the state
or public authority has acted in its public or in a private function.
Questions of conflict of jurisdiction are settled by a special Conflict
Tribunal. With us the question would arise whether this was to be an
executive or administrative, or legislative, or a judicial tribunal. It
would have to be a strong and independent tribunal in order to uphold
the guarantees of our American bills of rights. Professor Friedmann
holds that it gets down to "the cardinal problem of the relation of administrative discretion and legal duty." (p.179). Are we prepared to
relegate American bills of rights to administrative discretion? Perhaps
it will be said that the bills of rights create duties and so cut their
province out from discretion. In England, legislation has taken a great
domain of transactions to which public authorities are parties out of
the sphere of public law and made the public corporation operating
nationalized industries and many social services liable in contract and
tort the same as private individuals.
"[T]he cardinal problem of public law [is said to be]: How to preserve the legal security of the individual, in a society in which more
and more legal relations pass from the private to the public sphere,
without hampering the needs of administration in the social welfare
State." (p.183). It is a serious question how far this can be done.
Must the social service state run to absolutism? As to this the author
comes to two conclusions with some sub-headings. (1) He feels that
not only the legislature but the courts are gradually abandoning the
presumption, laid down in the text books on statutory construction, in
favor of the integrity of private rights. This, I .think, is equally true
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of the United States, and we need to be measuring the tendency with
the guarantees of our bills of rights. But he thinks that "the predominant judicial attitude is now one of balancing the interests concerned without any predisposition in favour of either public interest
or private rights." (pp. 183-84). But can this be done without in the very
way of putting it overweighting the scales on the side of what is
put as public interest? Was Blackstone wholly wrong in insisting
on security of individual private rights as a public interest? Isn't it
really a balance of the social interest in social or political institutions
and the social interest in the individual life? Otherwise we may answer the question in the very way we state it.
(2) He puts two tentative principles limiting administrative discretion, as to which I should address a preliminary question whether
in the United States in practice this would mean administrative discretion as to applying the bills of rights: (a) "where the imposition
of legal liability (in tort or contract, through the imposition of statutory duties, or through the construction of ministerial actions as
quasi-judicial) would interfere with the execution of public duties,
such legal liabilities will not be imposed on a public authority....
Where the urgency of the public interest demands it, but not otherwise, it should be construed as overriding private rights." (p.184).
Much American judicial decision in the last twenty years suggests
this. But how far does it call for giving up our constitutional polity?
(b) "Subject to these reservations, however, public authorities are
now increasingly subjected to the same legal duties as everybody else."
(pp.184-85). (i) "[S]tatutory immunities or powers do not convey a
general immunity from duties of care towards the public." (p.185).
(ii) "In the field of contract, there is an increasing tendency to treat
promises given by public authorities, including the Crown, as contractual, rather than administrative." (p.185). How about estoppel?
There was a serious abuse in the United States under the OPA and
under some state administrative authorities, where individuals in all
good faith followed the advice of local offices or even acted on letters
from what purported to be the head office and then found the advice
given them repudiated and thereby incurred serious penalties. Here
individuals or private corporations would have been estopped. The
author thinks it possible that the common-law system will eventually
develop a hierarchy of administrative courts and thus systematize administrative law. But his conclusion of the chapter is more in the
spirit of English-speaking peoples. He feels there is enough to "show
that the adaptability of the common law, which is the pride of English
lawyers, can meet this new challenge as it has met many others."
(p.186). It is the jurist's duty to assist both legislature and judges
in this task of adaptation.
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Chapter 9, The Legal Status and Organisation of the Public Corporation, taking up the dual character of such corporations, considers
a case where the question was whether the British Transport Commission, which took over the property of the Great Western Railway
Company when the railways in Great Britain were nationalized, was
subject to the Rent Restriction Acts. It was held that the Commission
was bound, on the ground that its powers were not the province of
government. 12 On the other hand, Blackburn, J., in The Mersey
Docks and HarbourBoard Trustees v. Gibbs,13 and Sutherland, J., in
Ohio v. Helvering,14 had drawn the line according to whether the
public corporation was a substitution for individual enterprise or, in
other words, on a distinction between the state as government and the
state as trader. This criterion, announced both in Great Britain and in
America, has been making much trouble for the courts in Australia.
Frankfurter, J., put the matter well in New York v. United States:'5
"In the older cases, the emphasis was on immunity from taxation.
The whole tendency of recent cases reveals a shift in emphasis to
that of limitation upon immunity."' 6 He suggests setting off "State
activities and State-owned property that partake of uniqueness from
the point of view of intergovernmental relations." 17 This is with respect to our American federal polity. Something depends upon the
legislation creating the public corporation. But the test usually applied
is ill-adapted to the dual character of such corporations; further as to
these corporations the courts have failed to develop a clear and simple
principle of legal policy. (p.214). The author holds that the public
corporation is an institution designed to integrate public enterprise
with the existing common-law system and should be treated by the
law accordingly. (p.216).
Chapter 10, Declaratory Judgment and Injunction as Public Law
Remedies, has less interest for the reader in the United States. Perhaps it is enough to refer to what Chief Justice Vanderbilt has called
"judicial deference" - a disinclination to entertain suits to enjoin
unconstitutional encroachments. 8
Chapter 11, Statute Law and its Interpretation in the Modern State,
takes up the growing importance of statute law. In 1908 in a paper on
"Common Law and Legislation,"'1 when there was a conflict between
the courts and the legislatures over social legislation, I said that the
12. Tamlin v. Hannaford, [1950] 1 K.B. 18 (1949):

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

L.R. 1 H.L. 93 (1866).
292 U.S. 360, 366, 54 Sup. Ct. 725, 78 L. Ed. 1307 (1934).
326 U.S. 572, 581-84, 66 Sup. Ct. 310, 90 L. Ed. 326 (1946).
Id. at 581.
Id. at 582.

18. VANDERBILT, THE DocTR=N
PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFCANCE 138-40

OF THE SEPARATiON

(1953).

OF PowERs

19. Pound, Common Law and Legislation,21 HARv. L. REV. 383 (1908).

AND

ITS

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 7

courts impeded or thwarted social legislation by an illiberal attitude
toward statutes conceded to be constitutional, regarding them as an
alien element in the law, to be held down to the strictest limits and
not to be applied beyond the requirements of their express language.
I suggested that there were four ways our legal system might deal
with a legislative innovation: (1) They might receive it fully into the
body of the law as affording not only a rule to be applied but a principle from which to reason, holding it, as a later expression of the
general will, of superior authority to judge-made rules on the same
general subject, and so reasoning from it by analogy in preference
to them. (2) They might receive it fully into the body of the law
to be reasoned from by analogy the same as any other rule of law,
regarding it, however, as of equal or coordinate authority in this respect with judge-made rules upon the same subject. (3) They might
refuse to receive it fully into the body of the law and might give it
effect directly only; refusing to reason from it by analogy but giving
it nevertheless a liberal interpretation to cover the whole field it was
meant to cover. (4) They might not only refuse to reason from it by
analogy and apply it directly only, but also give it a strict and narrow
interpretation, holding it down rigidly to those cases which it covered
expressly. I added that the fourth hypothesis represents the orthodox
common-law attitude toward legislative innovations, but that the third
represented more nearly the attitude toward which we were tending.
The second and first hypotheses appealed to the American lawyer of
that day as absurd. He could conceive that a rule of statutory origin
might be treated as a permanent part of the general body of law to
the extent of establishing rules, but not principles. I argued, however,
that the course of legal development upon which we had already entered must lead us to adopt the method of the second and eventually
that of the first hypothesis.20 Two years later the leading analytical
jurist of the day shook his head. He compared, as "differing views as
to the comparative efficacy of Legislation and Adjudication, as instruments for bringing law into harmony with social progress," 21 my paper
and the pronouncement2 of Chief Justice Baldwin of Connecticut
that statutes have no roots, spring from some temporary emergency,
and are hastily and inconsiderately adopted, and pronounced a judgment on the comparison: "[T]he preference will hardly be granted
to Legislation."23 But it cannot be questioned that today statutes have
taken over whole domains of the law and have introduced new principles of pervading force.
20. Id. at 385-86.

21. HOLLAND, ErLENCTs OF JURISPRUDENCE 76 n.2 (13th ed. 1924).
22. Baldwin, Constitutional Law in Two CENTUIES' GRowTH OF AasmmucAN
LAw 6-7 (1901).
23. HOLLAND, Op. cit. supranote 21, at 76 n.2.
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Professor Friedmann distinguishes three approaches to interpretation of modern statutes: (1) the pseudo-logical or text-book approach,
(2) the social-policy approach, (3) the free intuition approach. The
first governs in the current text books both in England and in America.
He puts as the main pillars of traditional interpretation of statutes the
"literal rule, the golden rule, and the mischief rule." (p.239). The
literal rule, the plain meaning of plain words, to be applied regardless
of the result, has been pronounced by Mr. Justice Frankfurter "a
pernicious over-simplification." The "golden rule" says that where the
ordinary sense of the words used would lead to inconsistency or
absurdity the literal meaning must be modified. The "mischief rule,"
the classical one since its formulation in the reign of Elizabeth (1584)
as reported by Coke in 1604, prescribes interpretation according to
the old law, the mischief it involved, the remedy and the reason of the
remedy -in
modern phrase the social purpose must be found from
the previous law, the specific defect in it for which the statute was
provided, the specific remedy devised and the reasoned principle of
that remedy. (p.240). The author tells us that the three main rules
cancel each other out. In a sense this is so. But the first, properly
used, means that there is to be no interpretation unless interpretation
is called for. If the meaning is plain, there is no ambiguity or inconsistency or patent absurdity in the text, the plain meaning of the
text is to be applied. Modern social legislation, however, must be
distinguished from the simple prescribing of a rule of property or
commercial law or inheritance or criminal law for a particular fact
or simple state of facts in a simple economic order. The text book
rules go back to Blackstone's ten rules in the eighteenth century and
to the seventeenth-century texts on logic. They are made for a different type of statute from those which give the courts trouble today.
Rightly the author objects to the rule of British courts against use
of "legislative history." But while in order to ascertain the mischief
and the remedy resort to the legislative history of a statute may be not
merely legitimate but necessary, it has been greatly abused in the
United States to justify interpretation where none was called for and
even to find meanings contrary to an unambiguous and consistent
text. His general criticism of the traditional canons of statutory interpretation as applied to social legislation is, however, well taken. These
canons are a set of learned formulas giving a deceptive appearance of
logic serving to conceal choice between opposing results of equal
validity and of inarticulate ideological premises depending on personal preferences and changing currents of social policy. (pp.243-46).
In the social policy approach the idea is to interpret so as to give
effect to the social objective. (p.247). But is that always something
given, or may it not leave itself to be found through interpretation?
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It is a useful corrective of the traditional canons but can only give a
partial answer to the problems raised by the legislation of today.
A third group of thinkers, in despair of any assured objective canons
advocate "free and creative" interpretation by the judge overlooking
that the final interpretation must be the work of a bench of judges,
not of a single judge. Its extreme exponents go further than cases of
palpable absurdity or result too unjust to be reasonably attributable
to the legislature. They discard legal principle -i.e., authoritative
starting point for reasoning and logical deduction altogether - and
see the solution of the problems of interpretation in free creative
handling of concrete situations. As to this the author reminds us that
under the Nazi regime the free intuition approach became a convenient
way to dispense with laws. Judges subject to severe political pressure
could distort existing statutes in the name of "healthy instincts of the
people." (p.250).
After all, as Professor Friedmann rightly warns us, legal logic and
canons of interpretation are not without value. There is long experience behind them. They are useful in the great majority of
routine cases. It is the marginal case and the novel situation in which
uncertainty makes judicial choice with little assured guidance the
best that is available. (pp.250-51). Even here the uncertainty is exaggerated. The received ideal of the end of law is usually decisive.
With this preliminary discussion he takes up comparative evaluation
of the approaches. He points out that literal and grammatical construction, reading of a clause in the context of the whole act, the
ejusdem generis maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, etc.,
break down where a clause neutral on its face requires a choice between values or where a statutory term is so broad as to allow of
divergent meanings. As Gray showed long ago the difficulty in such
cases is usually that the possibility of choice between divergent meanings did not occur to those who drafted the statute because the situation of fact calling for interpretation did not occur to them. Hence the
interpretation has to be in a measure legislative. As to the social
policy interpretation, all social legislation is not dictated by an easily
definable social purpose. Here again a choice of the social purpose
may have to be determined from the outside. We are told, and there
is truth in it, that there is room for free creative choice on this account, and are cited to the Swiss Civil Code which requires the judge
who finds a gap in a statute to decide as if he were a legislator. But
that is something very different from the give-it-up doctrine that there
is no possibility of a rational solution so that judges may and will do
what they like from unascertainable motives. Extreme skeptical
realism leaves the judicial process to political pressure of the worst
type. The weakness of most of the theories of interpretation is that
they assume all statutes are of one and the same type.
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Accordingly the author takes up next the need of differentiation
(pp.252-65). From Marshall to the present Supreme Court of the
United States, American judges have insisted that interpretation of the
Constitution is not the same thing as interpretation of an everyday
statute. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has also announced that doctrine and it has been recognized by the High Court of
Australia. But it has not always been seen that this means that general terms in a constitution must be understood in the light of changing social and political developments. (p.256). There are, then, seven
types of legislation to be considered: (1) constitutions, (2) social purpose legislation, (3) specific reform acts, (4) acts implementing international conventions, (5) penal statutes, (6) taxation acts and (7)
predominantly technical statutes. For the second he insists that the
presumption in favor of protecting private rights should be done away
with entirely. The avowed and unavoidable purpose is to do away
with certain private rights. But this cannot be laid down so emphatically for the United States where some private rights are secured
by the bills of rights. As to the third, a proposition that statutes in
derogation of the common law were to be strictly construed, operated
mischievously at one time in the United States, but has been abrogated
generally by legislation. As to the fifth, more and more penal legislation today is administrative in character and so has social-service ends.
Hence a distinction must be made in applying the maxim as to strict
construction of penal statutes. As to the sixth, tax statutes have come
to be a special type of social service acts. Hence the rule of construing
them in favor of the taxpayer is no longer applicable. (p.262).
Four general conclusions summarize an excellent chapter: (1) Increasing predominance of statute law is not sufficiently appreciated in
adjudication nor in legal education. There is need of more systematic
study of its principles. (2) The traditional rules of interpretation disguise a wide margin of judicial discretion in non-logical choice between
many rules. (3) None of the usual approaches to interpretation is
self-sufficient. The analytical approach provides useful guides for
routine cases but fails as to marginal problems. The social policy
approach gives clear guidance only where statutes have a clear, definite social objective. The free intuition approach opens the way to
prejudice and arbitrary decision. (4) Much may be achieved by
differentiating types of statutes. In a large proportion of predominantly technical statutes judges must be guided by the same principles
as in the creative development of precedent. To my mind this is the
crux of the matter. The received ideal of the end or purpose of the
legal order is the ultimate guide.
Chapter 12, Statute Law and the Privileges of the Crown, is an
excellent discussion of a matter of increasing importance in the social
service state. Three conclusions are reached: (1) The "lingering fic-
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tion" of a legally indivisible state must be given up and a theory of
legal liability substituted. Where the state either directly or through
incorporated public authorities carries on activities of a commercial,
industrial or managerial character the proper test is not an impracticable distinction between governmental and non-governmental functions but the nature and form of the particular activity. (2) The rule
that the Crown is not bound by statute unless specifically mentioned
or by necessary implication is socially and politically objectionable
and is not required by legal principle. It is an exception to the rule
laid down by Coke in 1601, as to statutes made "for the public good,
the advancement of religion and justice, the prevention of fraud, or
the suppression of injury or wrong," not the rule itself. As Coke puts
it the rule should be developed by the courts. What has passed for a
rule should be an exception limited to cases where an overwhelming
public interest demands that the Crown (state) should be exempt. (3)
There is need of "a more articulate theory of the state in modern
British law." (pp.273-74). One might say the same, although the need
is not yet so great, of American law.
From this the author passes to what is the most urgent problem of
democratic societies today: "Whether it is possible to preserve in a
planned State the essential principles of law of a free democratic
society." (p.277). This is considered in chapter 13 under five heads:
(1) The Welfare State and the Role of the Lawyer; (2) Three Meanings of the "Rule of Law"; (3) Dicey and the Rule of Law; (4) The
Road to Serfdom and the Rule of Law; (5) Five Legal Aspects of the
Social Welfare State.
On the first the author begins with the proposition that the planned
social welfare state is now accepted to a greater or less extent in every
western democracy and has become a basic reality of western life.
He finds three chief causes of this. One is the urbanizing and industrializing of western society. Physical and technical conditions of life
have increased the need for control. Second, these conditions have led
to development of social philosophy, which recognizes responsibility
of government for housing, unemployment, and social insurance.
Third, there is a chronic condition of mobilization or semi-mobilization,
military and industrial, in preparation for or in fear of war. This involves control over national assets and resources. The total effect is to
transform the free economic society in which the state simply keeps
the peace into a centralized society in which the state takes an active
part in the economic and social life of the citizen.
Dicey's phrase, "The Rule of Law," which came into general use in
political science, is said to require redefinition. One sense given it today is the existence of public order. Jennings so defines it. Under a
constitutional democracy -with
a written constitution -where
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courts have the decisive function of finding the meaning of rules of
the constitution, it means, the author tells us, ultimate judicial control.
Third, it may mean purely political control, as in Great Britain, where
the rule of law is what a Parliament as the supreme lawgiver makes
it and the courts have only the limited function of interpreting statutes.
(pp.283-84). This leads to consideration of Dicey's theory. At commron
law the idea of equality before the law and of universal subjection of
all persons and all classes of persons to one law administered in the
ordinary courts of justice was carried to its furthest extent. Everywhere in the common-law world acts of executive officials and administrative boards and tribunals are subject to scrutiny in ordinary
legal proceedings as to whether they are within the legal powers of
such officials. I have called this the doctrine of the supremacy of the
law. Dicey's doctrine had three aspects: (1) No man is punishable
except for "a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal
manner before the ordinary courts "of the land" and hence the rule of
law is not consistent with arbitrary "or even wide discretionary authority on the part of the government." (2) The rule of law means
equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land as administered by the ordinary law courts and therefore a rejection of
so-called administrative justice administered by special tribunals on
the Continental model. (3) In English law private individual rights
derive from judgments of the courts rather than from constitutional
codes. But I should think the first and the second are the essential
points.
Because he made a distinction between law and administration the
author considers that Dicey misunderstood the nature of administrative justice. He contrasted administration with law. Any wide measure of discretion not guided by principles was thought incompatible
with the rule of law. But, it is said, the evolution of modern government has made it increasingly clear that this antithesis between law
and administration is false. (pp.285-86).
This depends much on what is meant by law. Here the term "law"
is used in what I have called its third meaning- the judicial process
in distinction from the administrative process. This distinction was
not peculiar to Dicey. It was laid down by Sheldon Amos,24 by Gray,2 5
Pollock and Maitland 26 and Salmond.27 The first English recognition
of the administrative process on a par with the judicial seems to have
been by E. C. Clark. 28 Both the judicial process and the administrative
24. Amos, SCIENCE OF LAW 396-97 (1875).
25. Gray, Some Definitions and Questions in Jurisprudence,6 HIv.L.
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21, 24 (1892).
26. 1

POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW XXV

1895).
27. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE § 5 (1st ed. 1902).
28. 1 E. C. CLARK, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW: JURISPRUDENCE 75 (1914).
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process are instruments of the legal order. Also there is an element
of discretion in the judicial process and a function of adjudication in
the administrative process. But the two processes are characteristically
distinct. The one deals with each case as one of a type and seeks
to determine it by a rule for cases of that type. The other tends to
treat cases as unique and make ad hoc determinations. In the United
States administrative determination has not developed an ethos such
as the judicial process has in the common-law world.
Professor Friedmann says: "Legislative and administrative aspects
in a given action by a public authority are often inextricably mixed.
This makes Dicey's antithesis of law and administration as being one
between fixed rules and discretion highly unreal." (p.286). But the
sound kernel in Dicey's doctrine is a distinction between judicial
justice according to law and administrative justice as we have seen
it in the United States in the past forty years. This stands out in the
cases in which it has been possible to review administrative adjudication. Four features of administrative justice are continually in evidence. One is a tendency to decide in advance of hearing and without
hearing both sides, using the hearing when required by statute, as
little more than a technical formal requirement. Second, there is a
tendency to consult one side or hear statements or arguments from
one side with no opportunity to refute afforded to the other. Third,
action is taken upon grounds of which the party adversely affected has
had no notice and no opportunity to explain or refute. A striking
example of this may be seen in the Greene 9 case in England. At the
administrative hearing before the advisory committee, Greene was
wrongly informed as to the basis of his detention. The Court of Appeal
had held that Greene was not prejudiced by the mistake.,30 But those
who have had some experience of arguing in the dark before administrative tribunals may doubt this. What would have been possible
31
by way of remedy if prejudice had resulted was left in doubt.
Fourth, a serious feature of administrative justice is entrapment of
individuals by advice and information given by officers, subordinates
and local officials of the administrative agency and repudiated after
allowing it to be acted on in good faith. The judicial process goes on
upon public records showing what has been done, upon what facts and
why. It is too often impossible to give an assured answer to this in
case of administrative adjudication. I, myself, had an experience of
three successive hearings in an administrative deportation proceeding
in which the real basis of the proceeding was not revealed until it
29. Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, [1942] A.C. 284, 309

(1941).
30. Ex parte Greene, [1942] 1 K.B. 87 (1941).
31. Greene v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, [1942] A.C. 284, 306
(1941).
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accidentally appeared that a witness upon whose information the proceeding was based had mistakenly identified the person to be deported
with another alien who had left the country. Fortunately this could
be brought to the attention of the Attorney General before final action. If the real basis had been disclosed the proceeding would have
stopped at once. After forty years study of the decisions year by year
I see little advance toward a technique of administrative adjudication
in America such as I submit our constitutional polity calls for. There
are no such checks upon administrative determination as have been
developed as to judicial determination in the history of the common
law.
We are told rightly that two principles are essential to democratic
society: (1) the safeguarding of protected individual rights by impartial judicial authority (It is added that this need not necessarily
be the ordinary courts of law, but if not the administrative tribunals
must develop a technique of adjudication involving adequate checks
and an ethos of adjudication not yet manifest in the United States.);
(2) the principle of equality before the law of those who engage in
comparable legal transactions and enterprises. The sound kernel of
Dicey's doctrine is that the common law judicial process goes far to
secure these where the administrative process as to adjudication does
not in the United States.
The next section of chapter 13 is devoted to Hayek's version of
Dicey. But this is as extreme on one side as the doctrine of American
adherents of administrative absolutism is on the other. Hayek goes
on Bentham's idea of law as an aggregate of laws- that is, of rules
attaching definite detailed legal consequences to definite detailed states
of fact. Law in the second sense is by no means wholly a body of
rules. Even the body of authoritative materials of decision is not
wholly made up of rules. There is an authoritative technique and there
are received authoritative ideals. Even the body of precepts includes
rules, principles and standards. But the authoritative technique and
the received ideals afford a guarantee of how rule, principle and
standards will be found and applied. What is sound in Dicey lies here
and all that can be said for Hayek is that until like checks upon the
administrative process in action develop the lack of such checks leads
to administrative absolutism which leads toward the totalitarian state.
Next the author takes up the legal aspects of the social welfare
state. It is said that five different functions call for analysis. They
result from the activities of the state as (1) protector, (2) dispenser
of social services, (3) industrial manager, (4) economic controller and
(5) arbitrator. (p.298). The whole seems to come to little less than
the totalitarian state. But this is not the place to argue where, or
whether at all, the line may be drawn. The first activity requires no
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comment. The second requires a multitude of ordering and managing
functions by government departments and independent public authorities and so calls for development of public-law principles. (p.301).
Is there not, then, need of fitting these principles into our commonlaw system? I doubt whether administrative courts can do this so well
as our ordinary courts could with real guidance from juristic working
out of principles adapted to our common-law polity. With respect to
the function of the state as industrial manager, we are told that subjection to ordinary legal liabilities need not prevent the fulfilment of
economic, social and other planning functions. (p.301). Then is not
this precisely what the ordinary courts which have a developed ethos
and technique can do best? Professor Friedmann puts a question of
public enterprises operating side by side with private enterprises.
Should the government act impartially between the two? Or may the
government encourage one at the expense of the other, holding the
former a form of enterprise which it regards as preferable? We are
told that "a wise government will act with moderation" (p.303) and
that the question is one of "policy not of law." (Ibid). But ought there
not to be legal limitations if only to insure the moderation which
should be exercised by a wise government? Can we expect wisdom
under the conditions of practical politics otherwise?
Under the fourth activity allocation of essential materials involves
great powers in the government for the time being. It can thwart
certain industries and encourage others. Where the state is both
governor and engaged in industrial and commercial enterprises there
is danger in the bureaucratic allocation of resources unless there are
constitutional legal restrictions. Also the author points out that the
power of the government of the day to throttle criticism of its policy
by allocating paper or to curtail freedom of personal movement by
direction of labor, raises one of the most serious problems of the
modern democratic planned society. (p.305). We may well pause before making over our American legal constitutional polity to what
seems to lead directly to making the omnicompetent planned state
a totalitarian state.
As to the function of the state as arbitrator between different groups
in society, the author points out that a social service state need not be
collectivist. It can be a parental or dictatorial state "dispensing social
welfare among the citizens while forbidding them to engage in any
autonomous collectivist association" (p.305) as in Nazi Germany or
Fascist Italy or under Franco in Spain. Or the state may become responsible for all group action in its domain, regarding their "quasiautonomous" organization as required from the point of view of management. This is the arrangement in Soviet Russia, where there is a
function of arbitrator between state operated industries and trade
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unions. But, the author reminds us, the trade unions are not genuinely
autonomous organizations. They exist within a well defined national
plan and are subject to an overriding state policy. On the other hand,
in the modern democratic state groups and associations are allowed
on principle to develop freely and to adjust their relations by agreement and so in the sphere of private law. (p.306). In England there is
full and equal recognition of trade and manufacturers' associations,
employer's associations and trade unions "each entitled to foster and
protect its interests by group action." (p.306). I am not sure we can
quite say that for the United States.
But, says the author, "This purely passive function of the State is
proving increasingly insufficient." (p.306). Almost everywhere there
has come to be a chronic economic crisis. No state can afford a long
standstill of production or a rise of prices, wages and production
operating to paralyze the economic order. It becomes necessary for
the state to intervene. When it intervenes it cannot maintain a system
of referring both sides to free contract. Freedom of association involves also freedom not to associate and gives rise to serious controversy as may be seen in the United States today in connection with
the Taft-Hartley Act. As he says: "It is almost impossible to reconcile
a compulsory national wages policy with the recognition of full freedom of organised groups and the consequent right of unimpeded collective bargaining." (p.306). But the state in a democratic society may
have not only to be arbitrator between organized employers and organized employees but also between contending organized groups in
production and unorganized consumers. It may have to do this while
upholding freedom of association and while safeguarding the interests
of the state. In the endeavor to find a way through these manifold
and difficult tasks it is not hard to see why peoples give up and, as
the easiest way out, turn to absolutism.
The book concludes with a summary of ways in which reconciliation
of planning with democratic principles of justice might be achieved.
First, the privileges and immunities of the state in legal transactions
affecting individuals must be abolished and prerogatives which have
sometimes been unduly extended by the courts in time of war must
be limited. I have called attention to this in a note, "Administrative
Discretion and Civil Liberties in England."3 2 Second, there must be
proper control of administrative discretion. As to this the author tells
us there are three essential safeguards. There must be general legislative directives laying down principles of administrative action. These
principles must be enforceable by independent tribunals. Whether
there should be a hierarchy of special administrative courts or a combination of administrative tribunals with appeal to the highest civil
32. Pound, Note, 56 HARV. L. REv. 806 (1943).
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court he regards as relatively less important. But if making this control effective is left to administrative tribunals not part of the general
organization of judicial justice, can we expect these tribunals to develop the ethos of courts as known to the Anglo-American polity or
will they fall into a rut of administrative absolutism? Third, the state
as well as separate public authorities must be subjected to the principles of the common law. Public authorities simply as such are not to be
put in a legally privileged condition beyond the general principles
governing all privileges. There is to be no presumption that the state
or public authority is not bound by a statute. (pp.308-09).
A problem of the line between administrative discretion and legal
responsibility, the author tells us, is inherent in the nature of public
administration. (pp.309-10). We can't ignore that at least an accepted
minimum of planning calls for reconsideration of legal principles. We
must not expect too much of the law. But American constitutional
history shows that constitutional legal safeguards maintained by independent common-law judges can achieve a great deal. The real foe of
absolutism is law: "[F]rom their own experience and their deep reading in history," said Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "the Founders knew
that Law alone saves a society from being rent by internecine strife
or ruled by mere brute power however disguised. 'Civilization involves subjection of force to reason, and the agency of this subjection
is law."' 33 A balance of planned service and freedom is the problem
confronting the jurist of today. The Anglo-American lawyer has a
great opportunity of working out the paths of development of the
common law to meet this problem.
33. United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 308,
67 Sup. Ct. 677, 91 L. Ed. 884 (1947).

